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ABSTRACT—Two-component theories of intellectual development
over the life span postulate that fluid abilities develop earlier
during child development and decline earlier during aging than
crystallized abilities do, and that fluid abilities support or con-
strain the acquisition and expression of crystallized abilities.
Thus, maturation and senescence compress the structure of
intelligence by imposing age-specific constraints upon its con-
stituent processes. Hence, the couplings among different in-
tellectual abilities and cognitive processes are expected to be
strong in childhood and old age. Findings from a population-
based study of 291 individuals aged 6 to 89 years support these
predictions. Furthermore, processing robustness, a frequently
overlooked aspect of processing, predicted fluid intelligence
beyond processing speed in old age but not in childhood, sug-
gesting that the causes of more compressed functional organi-
zation of intelligence differ between maturation and senescence.
Research on developmental changes in functional brain cir-
cuitry may profit from explicitly recognizing transformations in
the organization of intellectual abilities and their underlying
cognitive processes across the life span.
Spearman (1904) discovered the ubiquitous positive intercorrelations
among intelligence tests. Since his work, most researchers in the field
of intelligence have viewed the structure of intelligence as static (see
Carroll, 1993, and Sternberg, 1994, for overviews), overlooking pos-
sible developmental transformations in the organization of intellectual
abilities and their underlying information processing and neurobio-
logical mechanisms.
A DYNAMIC VIEW OF INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT
ACROSS THE LIFE SPAN
Two-component theories of intellectual development (e.g., Baltes,
Lindenberger, & Staudinger, 1998; Cattell, 1971; Horn, 1968, 1970)
suggest an alternative to a static ability structure, by considering the
functional organization of intellectual abilities as dynamic—devel-
oping and transforming itself throughout life. Finding stronger cor-
relations between subtests of intelligence in children than in
adolescents, early developmentalists (e.g., Garrett, 1946) suggested
that a general ability gradually differentiates into fairly distinct ap-
titudes during maturation. This notion was later extended to cover the
life span. Specifically, the differentiation-dedifferentiation hypothesis
(e.g., Baltes, Cornelius, Spiro, Nesselroade, & Willis, 1980; Reinert,
1970) postulated that intellectual abilities are rather undifferentiated
in childhood; undergo differentiation during maturation, leading to a
multifaceted ability structure that remains largely invariant during
adulthood; and become undifferentiated again (dedifferentiation)
during senescence.
Three concepts are central in accounting for transformations in the
organization of intellectual abilities across the life span. The first is
the concept of two related facets of intelligence that define the con-
tinuum from fluid abilities, which are presumed to be primarily
biology based, to crystallized abilities, which presumably depend more
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on experience or knowledge (Cattell, 1971; Horn, 1968, 1970). A
conceptually similar distinction is that between fluid cognitive me-
chanics and crystallized cognitive pragmatics1 (Baltes et al., 1998).
The second central concept is that neurobiological and cultural,
experiential influences interact with each other to jointly bring forth
intellectual development throughout life. The relative contributions of
biology and culture are assumed to vary across life periods and ability
domains (e.g., Baltes, 1987; Baltes et al., 1998; Li, 2003; Linden-
berger, 2001).
The third concept is the proposition that during life periods when
there are strong biological constraints on information processing
mechanisms underlying knowledge acquisition and expression,
greater strengths of coupling among different facets of intelligence and
their constituent processes are expected. Specifically, when brain
maturity is reached and cognitive processes implementing fluid
abilities function at (or above) threshold levels, any subsequent de-
velopment in crystallized abilities is primarily conditioned by con-
textualized personal experiences, such as educational background and
occupational expertise. In contrast, during maturation and senes-
cence, the neurobiological substrates of intellectual functioning ap-
parently grow and decline, respectively; and they play crucial roles in
the development and aging of information processing mechanisms
underlying fluid abilities. During maturation, on the one hand, in-
crements in fluid abilities support knowledge acquisition (e.g., Cattell,
1971; Horn, 1968), and during aging, on the other hand, declines in
fluid abilities limit the expression of culture-based knowledge (e.g.,
Baltes et al., 1998). Hence, it can be expected that fluid and crys-
tallized intelligence, together with their constituent cognitive pro-
cesses, are more strongly related with each other at both ends of the
life span than in adulthood.
AIMS OF THE PRESENT STUDY
In light of recent evidence showing differences in functional cortical
organization during childhood development (see Johnson, 2001, for
review) and aging (see Cabeza, 2002, and Reuter-Lorenz, 2002, for
reviews), as well as differences in genetic contributions to intelligence
across the life span (see Plomin & Spinath, 2002, for review), behav-
ioral research on life-span transformations in the organization of
intellectual abilities reaches another level of relevance. Parallels
between transformations of cognitive functioning at the neurobio-
logical and the behavioral levels need to be identified to facilitate
integration of corresponding phenomena across levels (e.g., Li, Lin-
denberger, & Sikstro¨m, 2001).
Although findings supporting the distinction between fluid and
crystallized intelligence and their differential life-span trajectories
have accumulated (see Horn, 1970, and Horn & Noll, 1997, for re-
views), the differentiation-dedifferentiation phenomenon per se has
rarely been investigated directly. Examining transformations across
the life span requires a broader spectrum of tasks and a broader age
span than has been previously covered. So far, most studies have
examined childhood (e.g., Garrett, 1946) or old age (e.g., Baltes et al.,
1980; Schaie, Maitland, Willis, & Intrieri, 1998) separately. In the
rare cases when a limited age range covering both childhood devel-
opment and aging was included, either age-adjusted tests precluding
developmental comparative analyses or discontinuous age groups
were used (e.g., Balinsky, 1941). The research has also rarely com-
bined a dynamic differentiation-dedifferentiation view of intellectual
development with inquiries about information processing correlates of
intelligence, although integration of psychometric and experimental
approaches has been pursued in research on adult cognition and aging
(see Craik & Salthouse, 2000, and Deary, 2001, for review).
Furthermore, although performance fluctuation has been con-
sidered in developmental and aging research (e.g., Horn, 1968;
Welford, 1981), studies on information processing correlates of in-
telligence have predominantly focused on processing speed. However,
processing robustness (i.e., degree of performance stability, resulting
from less processing fluctuation) is also of interest, because speed and
accuracy aside, intraindividual response fluctuations when carrying
out a given task across multiple trials reflect another aspect of in-
formation processing. Recent findings suggest that decreased pro-
cessing robustness may reflect attenuation of brain integrity due to
pathology or aging (e.g., Hultsch, MacDonald, Hunter, Levy-Benche-
ton, & Strauss, 2000; Li, Aggen, Nesselroade, & Baltes, 2001;
Rabbitt, Osman, Moore, & Stollery, 2001). The majority of existing
studies on information processing mechanisms of intelligence have
neglected this aspect, so there are no data on how processing
robustness and its relations to intellectual abilities vary across the life
span.
In the present research, we aimed to address some of these lim-
itations. Fifteen psychometric tests measuring fluid and crystallized
abilities and 10 basic experimental cognitive tasks measuring pro-
cessing speed and robustness were administered to a population-
based sample covering a wide age range. Specifically, we directly
focused on life-span differences in the strength of coupling (covaria-
tion) between different intellectual abilities and the speed and
robustness of their underlying information processing mechanisms.
METHOD
Sample
A life-span sample with 356 participants 6 to 89 years old was ran-
domly drawn from a parent sample of 1,920 individuals whose names
and addresses were provided by the Berlin City Registry. The study
sample was stratified by age and sex. In view of differential rates of
developmental change across the life span, for the age stratification we
used 1-year, 4-year, and 3-year age bins for ages 6 to 15, 16 to 59, and
60 to 89, respectively. Excluding participants who missed multiple
testing sessions, who had severe health problems, or whose data
contributed to multivariate nonnormality, the working sample con-
sisted of 291 participants (149 males and 142 females) uniformly
distributed across 31 age bins. Excluded participants were distributed
almost evenly across life periods (13 children, 21 adolescents, 18
adults, and 13 old adults). To examine differences in the couplings
between intellectual abilities and cognitive processes across the life
span, we divided the sample into continuous age groups covering six
1In linking Cattell and Horn’s theory of fluid and crystallized intelligence to
life-span and cognitive psychology, Baltes (1987) distinguished between two
domains of intellectual functioning: cognitive mechanics, which refers to in-
formation processing mechanisms implementing the fluid abilities, and cog-
nitive pragmatics, which refers to culture- and knowledge-related applications
of the cognitive mechanics. The distinction between cognitive mechanics and
pragmatics generalized the theory beyond the psychometric tradition to en-
compass theories and findings from research in evolutionary biology, anthro-
pology, experimental cognitive psychology, and expertise, among other areas
(for further details, see Baltes et al., 1998).
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life periods: childhood (6–11 years), adolescence (12–17 years), early
adulthood (18–35 years), middle adulthood (36–55 years), late
adulthood (56–69 years), and old age (70–89 years).
Psychometric Measures
A battery of 15 psychometric tests from the Berlin Aging Study was
administered to all participants. The factor structure of these tests,
reflecting five primary intellectual abilities, which, in turn, define
fluid and crystallized intelligence at a higher level of aggregation, was
documented previously (see Lindenberger & Baltes, 1997). The five
ability factors are (a) Mental Mapping (commonly known as perceptual
speed in the psychometric tradition), measured by the accuracy of
Digit-Letter Substitution, Digit-Symbol Substitution, and Identical
Picture tests; (b) Memory, measured by Activity, Paired Associate, and
Text Recalls tests; (c) Reasoning, measured by tests of Figural Anal-
ogies, Letter Series, and Practical Problems; (d) Verbal Knowledge,
measured by the Practical Knowledge, Spot-a-Word, and Vocabulary
tests; and (e) Verbal Fluency, measured by the tests of naming names
of animals, red things, and words beginning with s. The first three
abilities are indicators of fluid intelligence (gf ), and the last two
define crystallized intelligence (gc). The fluency tests have sometimes
been viewed as hybrid measures of fluid and crystallized intelligence
(e.g., Lindenberger & Baltes, 1997; Salthouse, 1993), as they may, in
part, reflect processing aspects of intellectual functioning (e.g.,
working memory and processing speed), as well as verbal knowledge.
Experimental Cognitive Tasks
Speed indices (e.g., reaction times) are common information process-
ing correlates of intelligence. Individual differences in information
processing speed and other aspects of cognition have been docu-
mented separately in the literature on childhood development (e.g.,
Fry & Hale, 1996) and aging (see Craik & Salthouse, 2000, for re-
view). By piecing together results from developmental and aging
studies, researchers have conceptualized processing speed as an in-
formation processing resource underlying intellectual development
across the life span (e.g., Cerella & Hale, 1994; Kail & Salthouse,
1994). For the present study, we adapted 10 basic experimental
cognitive tasks (BECTs) to assess the speed and robustness of a range
of processes: visual search, response competition, long-term and
short-term memory search, and choice reactions. The 10 tasks were
organized in pairs, each pair consisting of 2 conditions (tasks) that
varied in cognitive load and assessed one of these processes.
The stimuli used in the visual search tasks were filled and unfilled
squares and circles. In feature search, the participants searched for a
filled circle (target) among empty circles (distractors). In conjunction
search, the participants searched for a filled circle (target) from a
background of distractors comprising both filled squares and empty
circles. A modified version of the flanker task with two response
conditions was used to assess response competition. In the compatible
condition, the color of the distractors was the same as the color of
the target, whereas in the incompatible condition, the color of the
distractors not only differed from the color of the target, but also was
identical to the color of a stimulus that required a competing response.
Memory search was measured by two pairs of tasks. The first in-
volved matching the names or the physical identities of letters. The
participants were presented with pairs of uppercase, lowercase, and
mixed-case letters (from the set A, a, B, b). In the physical-identity
condition, the participants indicated whether the letters were physi-
cally identical (e.g., AA and bb). In the name-matching condition, the
participants had to search semantic memory for the ‘‘names’’ of the
letters in order to indicate whether the letters shared identical names
(e.g., Aa and Bb). The second pair of tasks assessing memory involved
spatial patterns. The stimuli were pairs of circles, each circle having
three dots on its circumference. The participants indicated whether
the spatial patterns of the dots in a given pair of circles were the same.
In the matching condition, a stimulus pair was presented side by side,
hence no memory process was required; in the memory condition, the
two items in a pair were presented with a 3,000-ms delay between
them. Simple and choice reaction tasks formed the fifth pair of BECTs.
RESULTS
Age Gradients of Intellectual Abilities, Processing Speed,
and Processing Robustness
The cross-sectional age gradients of all variables are summarized in
Figure 1. Composite scores of the psychometric measures were
transformed into T scores (M5 50, SD5 10). The fitted curves were
based on the group means of the 31 age bins and were derived from a
combined exponential growth-and-decline function for reaction times
(RTs; cf. Cerella & Hale, 1994) that was modified for accuracy, speed,
and robustness data. Across all measures, the fitted curves accounted
for substantial portions of variance (r2 ranged from .73 to .97,M5.89).
As might be expected given the hybrid nature of the fluency measures,
the age gradient of verbal fluency fell in between the gradients of fluid
abilities and verbal knowledge, but closer to that of verbal knowledge.
Given the a priori theoretical distinction and the differential age
gradients of fluid and crystallized abilities in our data, we also com-
puted separate composite scores of fluid and crystallized intelligence.
In addition to simply examining RTs, we transformed the RTs of
each of the BECTs into processing speed by taking the inverse of RT
(i.e., 1/RT), a measure that also corrects the skewness of RT dis-
tributions. For the entire sample, the correlations between RTs for the
BECTs ranged from .69 to .81. A composite score of processing speed
based on the standardized 1/RTs of each of the BECTs was computed
and transformed into the T-score metric. We computed an individual
processing-robustness score based on the composite of standard de-
viations of the trial RTs for all the BECTs. The composite was then
reflected so that a higher score signified relatively small intra-
individual trial-by-trial RT fluctuations.
Our overall results support the distinction between fluid and
crystallized intelligence, as well as the idea about their differential
trajectories across the life span, although it is important to keep in
mind the caveat that cross-sectional age differences are only ap-
proximations of true longitudinal growth and decline (Molenaar,
Huizenga, & Nesselroade, 2003). The age gradients of fluid and
crystallized intelligence showed a lead-lag pattern, with fluid
intelligence exhibiting earlier growth and decline than crystallized
intelligence (Figs. 1a and 1c).
RTs of the BECTs showed various rates of growth and decline (Fig.
1b). As expected, the more difficult tasks (e.g., conjunction visual
search) showed steeper growth and decline than the easier tasks (e.g.,
simple reactions). Furthermore, age gradients of processing speed and
processing robustness corresponded very closely to the gradient of the
relatively more biology-based fluid intelligence, but less closely to the
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Fig. 1. Age gradients of intellectual abilities and cognitive processes. The graphs show group means and estimated age gradients of five
intellectual abilities (a), group means and estimated age gradients of reaction times (RTs) for 10 basic experimental cognitive tasks (b), and
age gradients of fluid intelligence, crystallized intelligence, processing speed, and processing robustness (c). VScon5 visual conjunction
search; Mem5memory-matching task; Mat5pattern-matching task; Name5Posner task, name-identity condition; VSfea5 visual feature
search; Phys5Posner task, physical-identity condition; Ficon5flanker task, incompatible condition; Fcon5flanker task, compatible
condition; Cho5 choice RT task; Sim5 simple RT task.
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gradient of the more knowledge-based crystallized intelligence (Fig.
1c). Maximum processing speed, processing robustness, and fluid
intelligence were achieved by individuals in their mid 20s. Decre-
ments were already visible by the mid 30s. The maximum crystallized
intelligence scores were achieved by individuals in their 40s, and
crystallized intelligence scores remained relatively stable until old
age, at which point they also declined (beyond 70 years of age, rage, gc5
.45, p < .01).
These results corroborate previous findings of differential age tra-
jectories of fluid and crystallized intelligence (e.g., Horn, 1970; Jones
& Conrad, 1933; McArdle, Ferrer-Caja, Hamagami, & Woodcock,
2002). Furthermore, they show clear parallels between the growth and
decline of processing speed, processing robustness, and fluid in-
telligence. Fluid intelligence manifests itself not only in measures of
the efficiency of mental operation, but also in accuracy-based mea-
sures of reasoning and memory abilities. The close correspondence of
the age gradients of processing robustness and fluid intelligence is the
first evidence for the relationship between the development of in-
tellectual functioning and processing robustness over the life span.
Individual differences in processing speed and robustness were
highly correlated. However, processing robustness also showed unique
predictive validity. Results from variance component analyses showed
that in late adulthood and old age, processing robustness directly
accounted for as much variance in fluid intelligence as did processing
speed. This was not the case for crystallized intelligence. Moreover,
processing robustness predicted old people’s chronological age above
and beyond the variance accounted for by processing speed (Table 1).
Intriguingly, all of these effects were unique to aging, but not present
during childhood development.
Differences in the Correlations Between Intellectual Abilities
and Information Processing Across the Life Span
We compared the strengths of coupling between intellectual abilities
and processing speed in adjacent age groups covering the six life
periods. First, we examined whether between-individuals variance
was equivalent across age groups. Tests of homogeneity (Cochran’s C
and Bartlett-Box F) showed that except for the composite memory
score and processing speed derived from one BECT (i.e., the pattern-
matching task), homogeneity of between-individuals variance obtained
across the six age groups. Furthermore, the pattern of differences in
between-subjects variance in these two measures did not statistically
favor children or older adults for exhibiting stronger correlations
among variables than younger adults. When adjacent age groups were
combined to produce larger sample sizes per group, the results re-
mained similar to those with the six age groups that we present here.
Reliability tests also showed that estimates of internal consistency of
most of the psychometric and experimental measures, except Activity
Recall, were comparable across age groups (Cronbach’s a ranged from
.80 to .96 for RT measures and from .65 to .95 for all psychometric
tests except the memory tests, for which Cronbach’s a ranged from .40
to .85). Excluding Activity Recall, which was less reliably measured
than all the other tests in early adulthood, from the analyses did not
change the results.
Overall, the extent of differentiation (i.e., multiple ability dimen-
sions) inferable from the interrelationship of the psychometric tests
was estimated by the number of dominant principal components for
each age group. As predicted, the estimated number of dimensions of
the correlation matrix involving the 15 tests was smaller in childhood,
late adulthood, and old age (Fig. 2a, which shows only two extracted
dimensions) than in adolescence, young adulthood, and middle
adulthood (Fig. 2b, which shows five extracted dimensions). Relatedly,
the amount of variance accounted for by the first principal component
was larger at both ends than at the middle of the life span, for BECTs
as well as for psychometric measures (Fig. 2c). Regarding specifically
the association between the biology- and knowledge-based aspects of
intelligence (Fig. 2d), we found that fluid and crystallized intelligence
were more highly correlated in childhood, late adulthood, and old age
than in adolescence, young adulthood, and middle adulthood (z53.7).
Processing speed correlated significantly with fluid intelligence
across all age groups (p< .01), and these correlations were stronger in
childhood and old age than in adolescence and adulthood (z51.9; see
Fig. 2e). Overall, the correlations were weaker for crystallized in-
telligence. Processing speed correlated more highly with fluid than
with crystallized intelligence in childhood and in old age (z52.74 and
z52.77, respectively). Similar trends were found in other age groups.
The pattern of stronger coupling with processing speed at both ends of
the life span than at the middle was similar to that observed for fluid
intelligence. In the case of crystallized intelligence, significant cor-
relations with processing speed were found in childhood, late adult-
hood, and old age.
The shared variance between processing speed and chronological
age in predicting intelligence was examined more closely. The amount
of predicted variance in fluid (Fig. 3a) and crystallized (Fig. 3b)
intelligence that was shared between processing speed and age was
highest in childhood and lowest in adulthood. With respect to pre-
dicting fluid intelligence, all amounts of explained variance, with
the exception of unique age variance and the shared variance in early
and middle adulthood, were significant beyond the .05 level. The
overall amounts of predicted variance were smaller for crystallized
TABLE 1
Results of Variance Component Analysis Showing the Unique Predictive Validity of Processing
Robustness in Late Adulthood and Old Age (55–89 years).
Predictor
Outcome variable
Fluid intelligence Crystallized intelligence Chronological age
Processing speed 4.1 (p < .01) 4.4 (p < .01) 0.6 (p > .38)
Processing robustness 4.7 (p < .01) 0.1 (p > .74) 6.5 (p < .006)
Shared speed and robustness 28.7 (p < .001) 13.3 (p < .01) 41.9 (p < .001)
Total 37.5 (p < .001) 13.5 (p < .01) 48.8 (p < .001)
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intelligence than for fluid intelligence. These results suggest that
factors contributing to transformations in the organization of in-
tellectual abilities across the life span may, in part, also contribute to
the age gradients of these abilities.
As a metric of physical time, chronological age by itself does not
have any direct causal influence on development, although it is an
accepted proxy. The central task of developmental research is to ex-
plicate the role of age by specifying endogenous and exogenous pro-
cesses bearing direct functional relations with development over time.
In this vein, we examined how well the relatively more internal (e.g.,
biological influences on information processing mechanisms) and the
relatively more external (e.g., cultural, experiential influences on
Fig. 2. Differences in the coupling between intellectual abilities and processing speed across the life span. In
the scree plots of the principal component analyses of intellectual abilities (a, b), the arrows indicate the
estimated number of dominant principal components (i.e., components with eigenvalues > 1). The graph in
(c) shows the percentages of variance in processing speed in 10 basic experimental cognitive tasks (BECTs)
and 15 measures of intellectual abilities accounted for by the first principal component (PC) in the six age
groups. The correlations between fluid and crystallized intelligence (d) and between processing speed and
these two facets of intelligence (e) are shown for the same six age groups.
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knowledge acquisition and expression) processes as reflected in our
entire set of measures predicted individual differences in chron-
ological age. Specifically, we examined whether the amount of shared
variance between internal biology-based and external culture-based
influences was larger at both ends of the life span than at the middle.
Results from a variance component analysis, with processing speed,
fluid intelligence, and crystallized intelligence predicting chron-
ological age (Fig. 3c), showed that significant amounts of individual
differences in chronological age were accounted for by these variables
in childhood (68%), adolescence (28%), late adulthood (22%), and old
age (26%), but not in young (9%) and middle adulthood (11%).
Moreover, at both ends of the life span, compared with other life
periods, a larger percentage of the predicted variance in chronological
age was jointly shared between processing speed and the two facets of
intelligence, amounting to 81% and 69% of the explained variance in
childhood and in old age, respectively.
DISCUSSION
Reexamining the century-old question of the structure of intellectual
abilities through the lens of life-span theories (e.g., Baltes et al., 1998;
Horn, 1968; Reinert, 1970), we found that the couplings between fluid
and crystallized intelligence (or, alternatively, between cognitive
mechanics and pragmatics) and their constituent cognitive processes
were stronger at both ends of the life span than at the middle (Figs. 2
and 3c). These results indicate more compressed functional organi-
zation of intellectual abilities and cognitive processes in childhood
and old age than in adulthood. In particular, these findings support the
Fig. 3. Results from variance component analyses showing differences in the amount of shared variances across the
life span. The graphs in (a) and (b) show the unique and shared contributions of age and processing speed in the
basic experimental cognitive tasks (BECTs) in predicting fluid intelligence (gf ) and crystallized intelligence (gc),
respectively. The graph in (c) shows the percentages of total and shared variance in chronological age predicted by
processing speed, fluid intelligence, and crystallized intelligence.
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dynamic differentiation-dedifferentiation view of intellectual devel-
opment across the life span. Our behavioral data mirror recent cog-
nitive neuroscience findings indicating that cortical functional
organization is dynamic, increasing in processing specificity during
maturation (Johnson, 2001), but decreasing in specificity (e.g., Logan,
Sanders, Snyder, Morris, & Buckner, 2002) or increasing in com-
pensatory integration during senescence (see Cabeza, 2002, and
Reuter-Lorenz, 2002, for reviews).
Furthermore, we also found evidence that the age gradients for
information processing speed, processing robustness, and fluid in-
telligence correspond closely (Fig. 1c). Overall, processing speed and
robustness are more closely related with fluid than with crystallized
intelligence, particularly during maturation and senescence (Fig. 2e).
Our results accord with previous research on cognitive aging showing
that fluid abilities correlated more with basic sensory processing and
crystallized abilities more with socio-biographical predictors (Lin-
denberger & Baltes, 1997), and thus provide further support for the
idea that these two facets of intelligence differentially reflect neuro-
biological and sociocultural influences on intellectual development.
The life-span perspective is also helpful for discerning similarities
and differences between maturation and senescence. Regarding sim-
ilarities, processing speed was slower and the levels of processing
robustness and intellectual abilities were lower at both ends than at
the middle of the life span. Also, the organization of intellectual
functioning was less differentiated in the maturation and senescence
portions of the life span than in the middle. These similarities not-
withstanding, our results also demonstrated that senescence is not
merely the mirror reversal of maturation: Processing robustness was
predictive of fluid intelligence and chronological age only in late
adulthood and old age, not in childhood. This result is consistent with
other recent findings suggesting that decreased processing robustness
in old age might reflect attenuation of brain integrity due to aging (e.g.,
Hultsch et al., 2000; Li, Aggen, et al., 2001; Rabbitt et al., 2001).
Together, these results lend support to the processing-noise hypothesis
of cognitive aging (Welford, 1981), be it conceptualized at the in-
formation processing or neurobiological level, or both (Li, Linden-
berger, & Sikstro¨m, 2001).
Two limitations of the present study are pertinent to life-span the-
ories. First, given the relatively small sample size per age group (on
average, n5 48), in addressing the overall relatedness between in-
tellectual abilities and cognitive processes, we limited our analyses to
robust and generally accepted exploratory methods (e.g., principal
components) in lieu of classical confirmatory factor analysis. Relative
to confirmatory approaches, these exploratory analyses yield cruder
comparisons of age differences in factorial structure per se. Second,
our conclusions rest on the assumption that age-comparative studies
of interindividual differences shed light on age changes at the in-
traindividual level. This assumption cannot be tested with the present
data set (cf. Molenaar et al., 2003, for relevant proofs and simula-
tions). Thus, additional longitudinal studies with larger samples are
needed to examine the dynamics, as well as the correspondences
between age differences and age changes, of intelligence structure in
greater detail (cf. Ghisletta & Lindenberger, in press; McArdle et al.,
2002).
In conclusion, the results of this study make a clear case for more
careful considerations of how the correlations among intellectual
abilities and their underlying cognitive processes vary across the life
span. In a related vein, recent theories of neurocognitive develop-
mental disorders also stress developmental dynamics as a key to
understanding cognitive impairments (Karmiloff-Smith, 1998). As
cognitive neuroscience rapidly advances toward unraveling brain
functions by using cognitive tasks and individual differences in cul-
tural, experiential influences (Hedden et al., 2002; Johnson, 2001;
Li, 2003; Paulesu et al., 2001) to probe the functionalities of various
brain circuitries, the behavioral phenomena of transformations in the
functional organization of intellectual abilities and cognitive pro-
cesses across the life span should be acknowledged, further explored,
and exploited.
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